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THE DYNAMIC EVOLUTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 
Karen N Scott* 
This article will explore selected innovations within multilateral environmental agreements that have 
contributed to the dynamic evolution of international environmental law within the context of the 
traditional rules relating to treaties, international institutions and state responsibility. It will argue 
that whilst these innovations undoubtedly push and develop the boundaries of these areas of law, they 
do not represent a significant departure from the traditional principle of consent that underpins 
international law more generally. But should they? The period of modern international environmental 
law (from 1972 to date), which from a lawyer's perspective might be described as dynamic and 
innovative, has simultaneously witnessed significant and persistent environmental change and 
degradation across the biosphere, atmosphere and hydrosphere. The question for 21st century 
environmental lawyers is whether international environmental law is fit for the Anthropocene and 
whether there is sufficient scope for future dynamic evolution within the constraints and structures of 
the existing international legal system. 
I INTRODUCTION 
As a relatively modern field of international law, international environmental law has, over its 40-
year history, deliberately developed processes, institutions and substantive measures designed to 
specifically respond to global environmental threats such as climate change and the Sixth Extinction. 
It is the interest of the international community as a collective, in the environment and, consequently, 
in the implementation of environmental obligations, that requires a refinement of, if not a departure 
from, the traditional consent-based approach to international law. This modified approach has been 
demonstrated by the sometimes innovative response of multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs) to issues such as reservations, treaty amendment, compliance and dispute settlement. 
  
*  Professor of Law, University of Canterbury. This article in significant part draws from and develops work 
recently published as Duncan French and Karen N Scott "International Environmental Treaty Law" in Michael 
Bowman and Dino Kritsiotis (eds) Conceptual and Contextual Perspectives on the Modern Law of Treaties 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018) 677. I am grateful to Duncan French for generously allowing 
me to draw from our joint work for this publication. 
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Moreover, in an effort to engage the maximum number of states – and, to a lesser extent, other actors 
– within a regime, MEAs have also developed flexible and differential obligations, blurring the 
traditional distinction between hard and soft law. Treaties have become "regimes" and regimes 
increasingly play a substantive role in the creation, implementation and enforcement of environmental 
law. Regimes interact with one another in what is described as a "regime complex" or "polycentric" 
system, and this interaction poses challenging questions about the relationship between treaty law and 
international institutional law, as well as the evolving nature of international law more generally.  
This article will explore selected innovations within MEAs that have contributed to the dynamic 
evolution of international environmental law within the context of the traditional rules relating to 
treaties, international institutions and state responsibility. It will argue that whilst these innovations 
undoubtedly push and develop the boundaries of these areas of law, they do not represent a significant 
departure from the traditional principle of consent that underpins international law more generally. 
But should they? The period of modern international environmental law (from 1972 to date), which 
from a lawyer's perspective might be described as dynamic and innovative, has simultaneously 
witnessed significant and persistent environmental change and degradation across the biosphere, 
atmosphere and hydrosphere. We have already exceeded safe operating limits or planetary boundaries 
in respect of three of the nine areas of concern1 and the extent to which humankind has become an 
ecological force in its own right has led some scientists to herald a new geological epoch: the 
Anthropocene. 2  The question for 21st century environmental lawyers is whether international 
environmental law is fit for the Anthropocene and whether there is sufficient scope for future dynamic 
evolution within the constraints and structures of the existing international legal system.  
II APPLYING TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 
The origin of an evolutionary development of international environmental law is that 
environmental obligations are largely (although not exclusively) law-making as opposed to 
contractual or synallagmatic. Environmental treaty obligations are not reciprocal in the traditional 
sense of being owed to individual or even a group of parties, but instead are owed to all parties or 
  
1  These are climate change, biosphere integrity and biochemical flows. See Johan Rockström and others "A 
Safe Operating Space for Humanity" (2009) 461 Nature 472; and Will Steffen, Katherine Richardson and 
Johan Rockström "Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human Development on a Changing Planet" (2015) 347 
Science 736. 
2  Will Steffan, Paul J Crutzen and John R McNeil "The Anthropocene: Are Humans Now Overwhelming the 
Great Forces of Nature?" (2007) 36 Ambio 614; and Will Steffan and others "The Anthropocene: Conceptual 
and Historical Perspectives" (2011) 369 PTRSA 8.  
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even to the international community as a whole.3 This creates challenges for traditional rules relating 
to treaties and state responsibility, which are largely based on the notion of reciprocal obligations. 
The concept of reciprocity for example, underpins the default rules relating to treaty reservations 
under arts 19–23 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)4 as well as the 
principles relating to material breach.5 Similarly, a direct relationship between states relating to injury 
or impact normally needs to be established for the application of the rules relating to state 
responsibility.6 The relative absence of reciprocity underpinning obligations relating to the protection 
of the environment is not exclusive to international environmental law7 but it is undoubtedly a 
defining feature of the discipline.  
The response of international law generally to what Simma has described as a move "from 
bilateralism to community interest in international law" 8  lies in the creation of erga omnes 
obligations.9 It is the notion of community interest, "'over and above any interests of the contracting 
parties individually"10 that lies at the core of erga omnes obligations, and that community or collective 
interest is explicitly acknowledged in most if not all MEAs. But how does an erga omnes norm differ 
from a non-erga omnes norm in practical terms? The VCLT itself provides little, if any, recognition 
  
3  This is a general rather than a universal proposition. Some MEAs provide for "reciprocal" as well as 
"legislative" obligations. For example, the extent to which developing countries are required to comply with 
their obligations under the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is explicitly 
dependent upon the effective implementation of developed countries' obligations under the Convention in 
respect of financial resources and technology transfer: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change 1771 UNTS 107 (opened for signature 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994) [UNFCCC], 
art 4(7). See also Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2303 UNTS 162 
(opened for signature 11 December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005) art 11 [Kyoto Protocol]; and 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 2256 UNTS 119 (opened for signature 22 May 2001, 
entered into force 17 May 2004), art 13(4).  
4  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 8 ILM 679 (opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered into force 
27 January 1980) [VCLT]. 
5  Article 60. 
6  Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts UN Doc A/56/10 (12 December 
2001), art 42. 
7  This is also a feature of human rights law, for example. 
8  B Simma "From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law" (1994) 250 Hague Recueil 221 at 
238. 
9  Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd (Belgium v Spain) (Second Phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 3 at 
32. 
10  J Pauwelyn "A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in 
Nature?" (2003) 14 EJIL 907 at 908. See also Simma, above n 8, at 298–299. 
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of erga omnes agreements. The Convention's recognition of a community or collective interest in a 
treaty is largely confined to developing principles to preserve that treaty – such as from the impacts 
of unduly wide reservations11 or the unilateral termination of or withdrawal from a treaty in response 
to a non-material breach12 – rather than acknowledging the potential of that treaty to impact on the 
rights and obligations of non-party states or the international community more generally. The VCLT 
largely dismisses the possibility that treaties may have legal consequences for non-party states without 
their express or implied consent,13 and the international community as a collective or indeed its 
individual members is not apparently able to hold states to account for those obligations outside the 
recognised rules of state responsibility or the rules relating to breach of treaties.14  
Within the context of the MEA however, a low number of agreements do require parties to ensure 
that all states act consistently with the treaty,15 or that non-parties provide comparable documentation 
or meet equivalent standards when trading or otherwise interacting with treaty parties.16 Although in 
practical terms states may, as a consequence, effectively comply with treaties to which they are not a 
party, this is not a technical departure from the traditional third party rules as set out under the VCLT. 
The treaty obligation in question applies to treaty parties as opposed to non-parties, and rules relating 
to breach and state responsibility can be applied only to parties. The same qualification applies to 
those treaties that restrict or even ban trade with non-parties (such as the 1987 Montreal Protocol on 
the Ozone Layer and the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
  
11  VCLT, above n 4, art 19(3). 
12  Article 60. 
13  Articles 34–36. 
14  See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd, above n 9, at 47; and East Timor (Portugal v 
Australia) [1995] ICJ Rep 90 at 102. Article 48 of the 2001 Draft Articles, above n 6, provides for the 
invocation of responsibility by a non-injured state in respect of erga omnes obligations but the rights of non-
injured states to intervene are limited to their ability to claim that the wrongful conduct cease and a demand 
for reparation on behalf of the injured state or "of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached". 
15  See for example Antarctic Treaty 5778 UNTS 402 (opened for signature 1 December 1959, entered into force 
23 June 1961) art 10.  
16  See for example Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 993 UNTS 243 (opened for 
signature 3 March 1973, entered into force 1 July 1975) [CITES], arts 2(4), 3(1), 4(1), 5(1) and 10; Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety to the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (opened for signature 29 January 2000, 
entered into force 11 September 2003), art 24; Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 2256 
UNTS 119 (opened for signature 22 May 2001, entered into force 17 May 2004), art 3(2)(b)(iii); and 
Minamata Convention on Mercury 55(3) ILM 582 (signed 10 October 2013, entered into force 16 August 
2017), art 3(6)(b). 
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Hazardous Waste).17 The ban is formally imposed on (and thus can be enforced against) parties, 
notwithstanding its practical impact on non-parties. 
More significantly for the purposes of the development of treaty law, MEAs have substantively 
developed and applied the concept of erga omnes inter partes. For example, most non-compliance 
mechanisms (NCPs) as developed by MEAs18 provide for proceedings to be initiated by any state 
(and in some cases other participants such as treaty bodies or even non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs)) without that state having to prove that they have been injured or are otherwise especially 
affected by the breach. Even outside of non-compliance mechanisms, practice permitting parties to 
hold states to account for breaches of environmental treaties without having to establish injury or 
special impact is developing. For example, Australia in the Whaling Case successfully alleged that 
Japan was in breach of its obligations under Article VIII of the 1946 International Convention on the 
Regulation of Whaling19 without establishing that its own interests were affected above any other 
state party.20  
III DYNAMIC EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW WITHIN MEAS 
As noted above, MEAs have been particularly dynamic in the development of treaty law in order 
to respond to the community or erga omnes interest in environmental obligations. As such, MEAs 
have focused on maximising the universal law-making impact of treaties as well as providing for 
innovative means to adapt, develop and enforce those obligations. Superficially they appear to impact 
the notion of consent, which is fundamental to international law, but in reality consent is largely 
preserved even if only at the point of ratification. These developments therefore arguably represent 
an adaptation of, rather than a departure from, traditional treaty law. 
  
17  Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 26 ILM 1541 (opened for signature 16 September 1987, 
entered into force 1 January 1989) [Montreal Protocol], art 4; and Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel) 28 ILM 657 (1989) (opened for 
signature 22 March 1989, in force 5 May 1992), Decision III/I (1995) (not yet in force). 
18  See further in Part III(C) below. 
19  International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling 161 UNTS 72 (opened for signature 2 December 
1946, entered into force 10 November 1948) [ICRW].  
20  Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan: New Zealand intervening) (Judgment) [2014] ICJ Rep 226. In 
fact, Australia deliberately avoided arguing that its interests were in any way affected in order to avoid 
engaging in any discussion as to the status of the area under contention as Australian waters pursuant to its 
contested claim in the Antarctic. 
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A Reservations 
One of the most important features of MEAs has been the move towards a general prohibition of 
unilateral reservations to the treaty's principal provisions.21 Most modern MEAs prohibit reservations 
to the principal instrument in order to preserve the integrity of the commitments undertaken, reflecting 
the community interest in the objects and purposes of the treaty.22 This is in direct contrast to the 
approach of human rights treaties for example, which can also be characterised as embodying a 
community interest. The trend within international environmental law is so ubiquitous that it might 
be argued that it constitutes an emerging customary norm within the field. This notwithstanding, it 
must be acknowledged that whilst reservations are typically prohibited in respect of the body of the 
treaty they are commonly permitted in respect of obligations relating to individual species, substances 
or measures listed in the appendices or annexes of MEAs.23 More generally, even where reservations 
are prohibited states may nevertheless unilaterally limit the extent to which they implement a 
commitment where qualified or differential language is used to frame the obligation in question.24 
B Developing Dynamic Treaties Through Amendment, Interpretation 
and Decision-Making 
In an area where rapid developments in science and, to a lesser extent, ethics and values 
significantly impact legal and policy approaches to environmental problems, the ability to respond 
flexibly to those developments is crucial to the success of any MEA. The primary rule, as set out in 
the VCLT is that "[a] treaty may be amended by agreement between the parties". 25 This basic 
principle underpins the rules relating to the amendment of MEAs but important developments have 
  
21  On reservations more generally, see A Pellet "Article 19 (1969)" in Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein (eds) The 
Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) vol 2 
405; C Walter "Article 19" in Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds) Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties: A Commentary (Springer, Berlin, 2012) 239; ET Swaine "Treaty Reservations" in Duncan B Hollis 
(ed) The Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 277; and International Law 
Commission "Text of the Draft Guidelines constituting the Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, as 
provisionally adopted by the International Law Commission" (2011) <http://legal.un.org>.  
22  A prohibition on reservations is not peculiar to environmental treaties. One of the earliest instruments to 
provide for such a prohibition is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 3 (opened 
for signature 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) [UNCLOS].  
23  See for example CITES, above n 16, art 23. 
24  See for example UNFCCC, above n 3, art 3(1) requiring parties to "protect the climate system for the benefit 
of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" (emphasis added). Of course a "unilateral" 
interpretation of a treaty may be challenged by other parties and subject to international adjudication.  
25  VCLT, above n 4, art 39. 
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occurred in relation to the appendices or annexes of those instruments not least in the utilisation of 
the Conference of the Parties (COPs) as the primary institution for the consideration and adoption of 
amendments. A significant feature of many MEAs is the tacit amendment procedure, whereby 
amendments will automatically enter into force for all parties unless parties expressly notify the 
depository otherwise. The tacit amendment procedure typically applies to amendments of appendices 
and annexes to treaties rather than to the treaty itself, although the 2013 Minamata Convention on 
Mercury26 unusually permits a new annex to be adopted by means of tacit amendment.27 Tacit and 
analogous amendment procedures serve a valuable function in facilitating the rapid updating of MEAs 
and maximising the likely acceptance of those amendments as states are forced to opt out rather than 
to opt in. However, in almost all MEAs state consent and the principle of sovereignty is preserved as 
states may ultimately opt out and refuse to be bound by an amendment if they so choose. This 
procedure therefore simply provides an example of the "any other means if so agreed" as envisaged 
in Article 11 of the VCLT. A greater challenge to the traditional rules on amendment is posed by the 
1987 Montreal Protocol, which permits adjustments to its technical annexes agreed to in the absence 
of consensus on the basis of a two-third majority (including "double" majorities of developed and 
developing countries) to take effect for all parties with no further ability to opt out.28 This process is, 
however, thus far unique among MEAs. 
Without formally amending a treaty, institutions such as COPs may nevertheless adopt decisions 
– binding and non-binding – often on a majority basis, which in practical terms significantly affect 
the scope or the implementation of obligations under the treaty. For example, in 1986, the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)29 COP adopted a resolution creating a quota 
system permitting limited trade in Appendix I species, such as the leopard, subject to specified 
conditions.30 The practical effect of this resolution was an informal amendment of CITES or, at a 
minimum, the adoption of a very particular interpretation of the obligation laid down in Article III of 
the Convention. Under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol31 the COP adopted, in 2001, the Marrakesh Accords, 
  
26  Minamata Convention on Mercury, above n 16. 
27  Article 27(3). 
28  Montreal Protocol, above n 17, art 4(9). 
29  CITES, above n 16.   
30  M Fitzmaurice "Expression of Consent to be Bound by a Treaty as Developed in Certain Environmental 
Treaties" in J Klabbers and R Lefeber (eds) Essays on the Law of Treaties: A Collection of Essays in Honour 
of Bert Verdiag (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1998) 59 at 75. See, now, Management of Nationally 
Established Quotas Resolution Conf 14.7 (Rev CoP15). 
31  Kyoto Protocol, above n 3. 
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which established wide-ranging and detailed rules relating to its implementation. 32  More 
significantly, the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)33 
COP adopted the Copenhagen Accord in 2009,34 which, whilst soft in character, was described prior 
to 2015 as "the most influential document that has emerged from the climate negotiations in the recent 
past",35 and which established the two degrees Celsius target that was ultimately incorporated into 
the 2015 Paris Agreement.36 More generally, all non-compliance procedures adopted under MEAs to 
date have been established by means of a COP or MOP decision although in all cases the original 
mandate for such a procedure can be found within the relevant treaty text.37 Nevertheless, the 
procedures developed to address compliance under these regimes create, in many cases, significant 
new rights under international law for non-state actors to initiate proceedings and impose complex 
requirements on potentially all parties to support those states unable to comply. Perhaps the most 
ambitious COP decision affecting the rights of treaty parties was the attempt, in 1994, to ban the 
transboundary movement of waste from OECD to non-OECD countries under the Basel Convention 
by means of a decision only.38 Concerns expressed by the parties over whether the COP could 
unilaterally alter parties' obligations under the Treaty39 led the COP one year later to adopt the ban as 
an amendment to the Treaty.40 Notably, that amendment has yet to enter into force. The extent to 
which MEA treaty bodies have the capacity to adopt decisions which impact on the treaty obligations 
  
32  Decisions 2–14/CP.7 UN doc FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (21 January 2002). 
33  UNFCCC, above n 3. 
34  Decision 2/CP.15 UN Doc FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (30 March 2010). 
35  D French and L Rajamani "Climate Change and International Environmental Law: Musings on a Journey to 
Somewhere" (2013) 25 JEL 437 at 446. 
36  Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 55 ILM 743 (opened 
for signature 22 April 2016, entered into force 4 November 2016). 
37  Until 23 October 2017 there was no treaty basis for the NCP established under the Espoo Convention on 
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context 1989 UNTS 309 (opened for signature 25 
February 1991, entered into force 10 September 1997) notwithstanding the adoption of an NCP procedure in 
2004 (see Decision III/2 Review of Compliance (2004); Decision IV/2 Operating Rules of the Implementation 
Committee (as amended by Decision V/4 Review of Compliance (2011)). An amendment to the Convention 
was adopted in 2004 to remedy this omission and insert a new article into the Convention (art 14bis) (Decision 
III/7 Second Amendment to the Espoo Convention (2004)) and this amendment finally entered into force on 
23 October 2017. 
38  Decision II/12 (1994). 
39  RR Churchill and G Ulfstein "Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law" (2000) 94 AJIL 623 at 639. 
40  Decision III/1 (1995) Amendment to the Basel Convention. 
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of states is principally a matter for international institutional law rather than treaty law per se.41 
However, it is evident that some MEAs have deliberately developed these institutional procedures to 
"overcome the cumbersome treaty-making process" 42  in order to respond to environmental 
challenges.43  
C Material Breach and Non-Compliance with MEAs 
The rules relating to material breach as set out in Article 60 of the VCLT44 provide a rare example 
of where the Convention makes a limited distinction between law-making and contractual treaties.45 
Taken as a whole, the provision seeks to balance the rights of the collective in supporting the stability 
of the agreement with the right of an injured party to obtain appropriate remedy and redress in the 
event of breach. The principle of negative reciprocity, which underpins Article 60 of the VCLT,46 is 
most clearly demonstrated in its requirement that a party can only unilaterally47 suspend a multilateral 
treaty as against the party in breach where they have been especially affected by the breach48 or where 
the breach radically changes the position of every party with respect to the further performance of 
their obligations under the treaty.49 In short, the party wishing to suspend an agreement against a party 
  
41  G Ulfstein "Treaty Bodies and Regimes" in Duncan B Hollis (ed) The Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2012) 428 at 428. 
42  At 435. 
43  The nature of the resolution or decision and the level of support will be important factors in determining the 
extent to which treaties can be developed through this mechanism. For example, the International Court of 
Justice concluded that resolutions adopted by only a majority of states within the International Whaling 
Commission could not be used to interpret art 8 of the 1946 ICRW, above n 19, nor as subsequent practice 
establishing an agreement of the parties within the meaning of art 31(a)–(b) of the VCLT, above n 4: Whaling 
in the Antarctic, above n 20, at [46] and [83]. 
44  See generally T Giegerich "Article 60" in Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds) Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Springer, Berlin, 2012) 1021; MM Gomaa Suspension or Termination 
of Treaties on Grounds of Breach (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1996); B Simma and CJ Tams 
"Article 60 (1969)" in Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein (eds) The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: 
A Commentary  (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) vol 2 1351; and B Simma and CJ Tams "Reacting 
against Treaty Breaches" in Duncan B Hollis (ed) The Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2012) 576.  
45  Simma and Tams, above n 44, at 1353.  
46  Giegerich, above n 44, at 1022. 
47  States parties to an agreement may choose to suspend or terminate a treaty against a party in breach or in its 
entirety by unanimous agreement: VCLT, above n 4, art 60(2)(a). 
48  Article 60(2)(b). 
49  Article 60(2)(c). 
616 (2018) 49 VUWLR 
in breach must have a "particular interest" in the performance of the obligation in question, "which 
goes beyond that of the other parties to the treaty."50 This requirement, combined with the high-
threshold definition of material breach,51 would seem to render the application of Article 60 of the 
VCLT largely irrelevant to the typical MEA where obligations are generally erga omnes partes rather 
than clearly reciprocal in nature.52 During the negotiations of the VCLT Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice 
advocated that states should not be permitted to unilaterally suspend multilateral treaties in response 
to breach.53 Although his argument was rejected in general terms, a specific exception was provided 
for in Article 60(5) of the VCLT, which denies the right to suspend or terminate humanitarian treaties 
in the event of breach.54   
Responding to the inadequacy of Article 60 of the VCLT in respect of community-focused 
environmental obligations, more than twenty MEAs have developed or are in the process of 
developing internal procedures to deal with parties in breach or, as it is now commonly termed, in 
non-compliance with the treaty.55 Typically, an MEA non-compliance procedure (NCP) is managed 
by a designated institution established by the treaty, and any party in non-compliance may be referred 
to that institution by other parties, by itself or,56 increasingly, by a treaty institution such as the 
  
50  Simma and Tams, above n 44, at 1365. 
51  Article 60(3) of the VCLT, above n 4, defines a material breach as a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned 
by that treaty or a violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment to the object or purpose of that 
treaty. 
52  The VCLT, above n 4, is silent on the consequences of a non-material breach and the extent to which an 
uninjured party may challenge a party in breach.  
53  Giegerich, above n 44, at 1036. For a discussion of the pre-Vienna position on the right to respond to a breach 
of a treaty, see S Rosenne Breach of Treaty (Grotius Publications, Cambridge, 1985) at 3–44. 
54  IM Sinclair The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1983) 
at 190. 
55  See generally Antonio Cardesa-Salzmann "Constitutionalising Secondary Rules in Global Environmental 
Regimes: Non-Compliance Procedures and the Enforcement of Multilateral Environmental Agreements" 
(2012) 24 JEL 103; J Klabbers "Compliance Procedures" in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunée and Ellen Hey 
(eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) 
995; Karen N Scott "Non-compliance Procedures and Dispute Resolution Mechanisms under international 
Environmental Agreements" in D French, M Saul and ND White (eds) International Law and Dispute 
Settlement: New Problems and Techniques (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010) 225; and T Treves and others 
(eds) Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental 
Agreements (TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2009). 
56  The first MEA to permit self-referral in non-compliance proceedings was the 1987 Montreal Protocol, above 
n 17, and this mode of initiating proceedings was used relatively extensively in the 1990s. See DG Victor 
"The Operation and Effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol's Non Compliance Procedure" in DG Victor, K 
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secretariat or meeting of the parties.57 In a minority of cases proceedings can even be initiated by an 
appropriately qualified NGO or an individual.58 This multilateral as opposed to reciprocal response 
to breach, which is further enhanced by the increasing levels of public participation within non-
compliance proceedings,59 has been developed by MEAs operating in the areas of climate change, 
ozone depletion, wildlife protection, biodiversity conservation, pollution prevention and control and 
fisheries management among others. 60  Moreover, in contrast to the coercive approach which 
characterises the traditional response to a breach of treaty as developed by the law of treaties and the 
rules relating to countermeasures, non-compliance proceedings generally adopt a more facilitative 
approach, and measures adopted by compliance bodies are often designed to assist rather than to 
punish a state in non-compliance with their treaty obligations.61 The preference for facilitation rather 
than coercion has recently been expressed by the parties to the 2015 Paris Agreement in Article 15, 
which establishes that the new NCP shall, in contrast to the Kyoto NCP, be "facilitative in nature and 
function in a manner that is transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive". 
The relationship between NCPs and the more traditional rules relating to breach of treaty, dispute 
resolution and countermeasures is not clear.62 On one hand, it might be argued that NCPs constitute 
specialised rules of application to breach within MEAs and, consequently, must be applied instead of 
  
Raustiala and EB Skolnkioff (eds) The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental 
Commitments: Theory and Practice (MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass), 1998) 137. 
57  Almost 20 MEAs provide for the institutional initiation of NCPs and in practice, the overwhelming majority 
of proceedings have been initiated by institutions to date. See Scott, above n 55, at Appendix II. 
58  For example, non-compliance proceedings can be initiated by individuals or appropriately qualified NGOs 
under the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters 2161 UNTS 447 (opened for signature 25 June 1998, entered into force 
30 October 2001); and the Bern Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats 
ETS 104 (opened for signature 19 September 1979, entered into force 1 June 1982).  
59  Scott, above n 55, at 249–251. 
60  For a comprehensive list of the MEAs that have developed or are in the process of developing non-compliance 
procedures, see Scott, above n 55, at Appendix I. 
61  Scott, above n 55, at 244–247. The emphasis on facilitating compliance as opposed to penalising non-
compliance supports a more general managerial approach to addressing implementation of and compliance 
with MEAs. See further A Chayes and A Handler Chayes The New Sovereignty: Compliance with Regulatory 
Agreements (Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass), 1995). It should be noted penal measures are by 
no means irrelevant and that a number of non-compliance procedures adopt a combined facilitative and 
coercive approach towards compliance. The NCP established under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, above n 3, for 
example comprises both a Facilitative and an Enforcement Branch. 
62  See M Fitzmaurice "Non-Compliance Procedures and the Law of Treaties" in T Treves and others (eds) Non-
Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements 
(TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2009) 453. 
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the default rules relating to breach and countermeasures.63 On the other hand, it can be argued that a 
compliance measure which is neither binding nor established pursuant to a binding regime cannot be 
applied instead of the traditional rules of dispute resolution and responding to breach. Moreover, 
NCPs are generally not comprehensive, and their scope may be limited to dealing with the 
consequences of designated treaty provisions. Typically, obligations associated with technical and 
financial support are excluded from the non-compliance process. 64  In principle therefore, non-
compliance procedures arguably supplement and support the traditional rules relating to treaties, 
countermeasures and dispute resolution rather than replacing them. In practice however, NCPs are in 
effect replacing traditional rules owing to their ability to respond more sensitively to the erga omnes 
and non-reciprocal nature of environmental obligations.65  
D Blurring the Distinction between Soft and Hard Law 
The distinction between so-called "soft" and "hard" law in the field of international environmental 
law is increasingly and indeed deliberately blurred. The corpus of the discipline comprises many 
commitments that are not obviously binding but which are exceedingly influential: the 2010 Aichi 
Biodiversity Targets66  and 2009 Copenhagen Accord 67  and the 2015 Sustainable Development 
Goals 68  provide obvious examples. One conservation agreement, the 1979 Migratory Species 
Convention, has deliberately developed non-binding69  but normative regimes in respect of 19 
species,70 which are intended to operate in a manner of a typical treaty albeit on a voluntary basis in 
order to maximise participation.  
  
63  VCLT, above n 4, art 60(4); and Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
above n 6, art 55. 
64  Scott, above n 55, at 239–241. 
65  Where of course there is no NCP or where a party to a dispute is not also a party to the NCP states may well 
resort to traditional dispute settlement mechanisms. See for example Whaling in the Antarctic, above n 20, at 
226; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Judgment) [2010] ICJ Rep 14; and The South 
China Sea Arbitration (The Philippines v China) (Award) PCA 2013-19, 12 July 2016.  
66  Decision X/2 (2010) Strategic Plan for Biodiversity Targets 2011 – 2020, including Aichi Biodiversity 
Targets. 
67  Decision 2/CP.15, above n 34. 
68  Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development GA Res 70/1 (2015). 
69  On the binding (or otherwise) nature of memoranda of understanding, see A Aust "Alternatives to Treaty-
Making: MOUs as Political Commitments" in Duncan B Hollis (ed) The Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2012) 46; and J Klabbers The Concept of Treaty in International Law (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1996). 
70  See Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals "Species" <www.cms.int>. 
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Within treaties, which are themselves binding, high level commitments or statements of principle 
are sometimes described as "soft".71 Moreover, in this field more than any other treaties may provide 
for differential obligations relating to the scope, nature and timing of the obligations within a treaty.72 
Typically referred to as common but differentiated responsibilities (and respective capabilities) 
(CBDRRC), the first treaty to incorporate CBDRRC in a structured way was the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol, and this flexible and innovative approach to the creation of treaty obligations is integral to 
the success of the ozone regime.73 The principle underpins the climate regime74 and is enshrined in 
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which applies emissions commitments only to Annex I states.75 To the 
extent that MEAs permit the exercise of state discretion in determining the level of commitment or 
action on the basis of capacity (sometimes referred to as contextual differentiation) then those 
commitments may also be described as "soft" or, at the very least, demonstrating modern "variations" 
of "hard law".76 
Arguably this blurring of hard and soft law has been taken to a whole new level in the 2015 Paris 
Agreement, which uniquely (thus far) permits states to unilaterally determine their level of 
commitment in respect of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and/or enhancing sinks in light of the 
overall target of restricting temperature rise to no more than two degrees Celsius.77 Whilst the Paris 
Agreement itself is clearly legally binding (in contrast to, for example, the 2009 Copenhagen Accord) 
there is uncertainty as to whether the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) are themselves 
legally binding with some commentators arguing that they are legally binding78 and others suggesting 
that the NDCs themselves are not but the various administrative obligations associated with them 
  
71  A Boyle "Soft Law in International Law-making" in M Evans (ed) International Law (3rd ed, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2010) 122 at 130–132. 
72  See P Cullet Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (Ashgate, Burlington, 2003); and D 
French "Developing States and International Environmental Law: The Importance of Differentiated 
Responsibilities" (2000) 49 ICLQ 35. 
73  Marco Gonzalez, Kristen N Taddonio and Nancy J Sherman "The Montreal Protocol: How Today's Successes 
Offer a Pathway to the Future" (2005) 5 J Environ Stud Sci 122 at 125. 
74  See UNFCCC, above n 3, arts 3–4.  
75  Kyoto Protocol, above n 3, art 4. 
76  Gabrielle Spilker and Vally Koubi "The Effects of Treaty Legality and Domestic Institutional Hurdles on 
Environmental Treaty Ratification" (2016) 16 IEA 223. 
77  Paris Agreement, above n 36, art 4. 
78  Daniel Bodansky "The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement" (2016) 25 RECIEL 142 at 146. 
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(such as reporting) are.79 One scholar has gone so far as to describe the Paris Agreement as "an 
exemplar of new lawmaking".80  
IV BUILDING REGIMES UNDER TREATY LAW 
Liberated from international relations scholarship the term "regime" is used in international law 
to describe a particularly dynamic and innovative approach to law-making adopted by most MEAs. 
This approach typically comprises: a framework or over-arching convention setting out guiding 
principles, general obligations and establishing institutions; protocols or annexes developing the 
substance of the regime; and formal decisions and resolutions adopted by the conference or meeting 
of the parties intended to guide, inform or develop its implementation. 81  Typically the MEA 
establishes institutions such as a decision-making body (COP or MOP), a secretariat, technical bodies, 
a financial mechanism, and, increasingly, a compliance body.82 Examples of regimes (in contrast to 
treaties) include the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and its eight 
protocols,83 the 1979 Convention on Migratory Species and its seven Agreements,84 19 Memoranda 
of Understanding and four special species initiatives, and the 1992 UNFCCC and its 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol and 2015 Paris Agreement. In creating their own "institutional apparatuses", 85  often 
described as "autonomous institutional arrangements",86 MEAs create and in doing so "become 
  
79  See Guri Bang, Jon Hovi and Tora Skodvin "The Paris Agreement: Short-Term and Long-Term 
Effectiveness" (2016) 4 Politics and Governance 209; and Christina Voigt "The Compliance and 
Implementation Mechanism of the Paris Agreement" (2016) 25 RECIEL 161. 
80  Lavanya Rajamani "The 2015 Paris Agreement: Interplay Between Hard, Soft and Non-Obligations" (2016) 
28 JEL 337 at 358. 
81  See generally T Gehring "Treaty-Making and Treaty Evolution" in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunée and Ellen 
Hey (eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2007) 467; and PC Szasz "International Norm-Making" in E Brown-Weiss (ed) Environmental Change and 
International Law (United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 1992) 41. 
82  See generally G Ulfstein "Treaty Bodies" in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunée and Ellen Hey (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) 877; and G Ulfstein 
"International Framework for Environmental Decisionmaking" in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, David M Ong and 
Panos Merkouris (eds) Research Handbook on International Environmental Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham, 2010) 26. 
83  Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 18 ILM 1442 (opened for signature on 30 
November 1979, entered into force 16 March 1983). 
84  Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals 19 ILM 15 (opened for signature on 
23 June 1979, entered into force 1 November 1983). 
85  Gehring, above n 81, at 473.  
86  Churchill and Ulfstein, above n 39. 
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themselves machineries for the making and development of international environmental law".87 In 
this sense MEAs might be described as "quasi-constitutional" treaties.88 Nevertheless, while the locus 
of decision-making, where decisions can be adopted by consensus, has formally shifted from states 
to an institution – the COP – states are not bound by decisions in the absence of their consent even 
under simplified or expedited treaty amendment procedures, with the one exception of adjustments to 
the Montreal Protocol, as noted above.89 Of arguably greater significance is the function performed 
by these institutions in developing the interpretation and implementation of treaties by virtue of 
decision-making and their role in responding to non-compliance, as described above. 
V LINKING AND LEVERAGING REGIMES 
The term "fragmentation" describes "the emergence of specialised and (relatively) autonomous 
rules or rule complexes, legal institutions and spheres of legal practice",90 and is typically used to 
emphasise the isolation and disconnect between regimes and institutions as well as treaty 
congestion.91 Whilst of relevance to international law generally, the term has particular resonance in 
the area of international environmental law where the contrast between autonomous and, to an extent, 
isolated treaty regimes, with the integrated ecological ecosystems they are designed to manage, is 
particularly stark. It is thus unsurprising that one of the most important dynamic evolutionary 
developments within this field has been the development of institutional connections or linkages 
between MEAs, designed to unleash "hidden synergies between regimes".92 Between MEAs:93 
  
87  Gehring, above n 81, at 474.  
88  C Brölmann "Specialised Rules of Treaty Interpretation: International Organisations" in Duncan B Hollis (ed) 
The Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 507 at 509.  
89  See G Handl "International 'Lawmaking' by Conferences of the Parties and Other Politically Mandated 
Bodies" in Rüdiger Wolfrum and Volker Röben (eds) Developments of International Law in Treaty Making 
(Springer, Berlin, 2005) 127.  
90  International Law Commission Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006) at 11(8) 
[Fragmentation of International Law]. 
91  Treaty congestion refers to the multiplication of overlapping treaties. See Edith Brown Weiss "International 
Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order" (1993) 81 Georgetown 
U LJ 675 at 697. 
92  Oren Perez "Multiple Regimes, Issue Linkage and International Cooperation: Exploring the Role of the WTO" 
(2005) 26 UPJIEL 735 at 735. 
93  Karen N Scott "International Environmental Governance: Managing Fragmentation through Institutional 
Connection" (2011) 12 MJIL 177 at 184. 
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… linkage and institutional interaction operate on a number of levels and may arise as a mere consequence 
of ecological, sociological or functional interdependence or as a result of a deliberate governance strategy. 
Both inadvertent and deliberate linkages can be identified between MEAs, but deliberate 
coordination, in relation to information sharing, the development of joint initiatives and, rarely, the 
pooling of resources exemplify linkage as described by international relations scholars. For example, 
the 1992 Biodiversity Convention94 has entered into formal relationships with 18 other MEAs,95 as 
well as over 140 memoranda of understanding with other bodies including scientific institutions, 
universities and botanical gardens.96 It has developed active programmes of coordination with the so-
called biodiversity cluster.97 The most extensive example of formal institutional cooperation has been 
developed by the Basel, Stockholm98 and Rotterdam99 Conventions – the so-called chemicals cluster 
– which have held a series of joint meetings at which joint (synergies) decisions have been adopted 
to develop joint work programmes and develop administrative synergies between the three 
conventions including the appointment of an Executive Secretary of all three Conventions.100  
These connections and linkages between regimes have given rise to new descriptions of 
environmental governance, which is sometimes described as polycentric 101  or underpinned by 
  
94  Convention on Biological Diversity 31 ILM 822 (opened for signature 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 
December 1993). 
95  Scott, above n 93, at 192. 
96  At 192. 
97  See Richard Caddell "Inter-Treaty Cooperation, Biodiversity Conservation and the Trade in Endangered 
Species" (2013) 22 RECIEL 264; Richard Cadell "The Integration of Multilateral Environmental Agreements: 
Lessons from the Biodiversity-Related Conventions" (2011) 22 YIEL 37; and José Octavio Valázquez Gomar 
"Environmental Policy Integration among Multilateral Environmental Agreements: The Case of Biodiversity" 
(2016) 16 IEA 525.  
98  Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 40 ILM 532 (opened for signature 22 May 2001, entered into 
force 17 May 2004). 
99  Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in 
International Trade 38 ILM 1 (opened for signature 11 September 1998, entered into force 24 February 2004). 
100  An overview of and links to the synergies decisions can be found at "History of the Synergies Process" 
Synergies among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm conventions <www.brsmeas.org>. 
101  Victor Galaz and others "Polycentric Systems and Interacting Planetary Boundaries – Emerging Governance 
of Climate Change-Ocean Acidification-Marine Biodiversity" (2012) 81 Ecological Economics 21. 
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network structure102 or, drawing on comparisons with ecosystems, a "complex adaptive system."103 
The most widely used description of this new form of environmental governance is "regime complex" 
defined as a system "of functionally overlapping institutions that continuously affect each other's 
operations."104 Regime complexes can be found across the field of international environmental law 
and, as a concept, has been explored in the context of climate change105 and biodiversity106 – and 
indeed the relationship between climate change and biodiversity107 – and is no longer confined to 
MEA structures but also encompasses private authorities.108 A recent example of regime complex in 
action is the adoption of the 2016 Kigali Amendment to the 1987 Montreal Protocol on the Ozone 
Layer to phase out hydroflurcarbons (HFCs), a powerful greenhouse gas, a measure predicted to 
prevent approximately 0.5 degrees of warming by 2100 thus contributing to efforts to address climate 
change.109  
These forms of arrangements between MEAs – whether deliberate or inadvertent – raise important 
legal questions associated with the status and capacity of MEA institutions to enter into such 
arrangements, the status of the agreements themselves and the impact of those agreements on the 
obligations of states, particularly where membership of the agreements cooperating is not 
coincidental. In short, the regime and the regime complex create both opportunities and challenges 
for traditional consent-based international law.  
  
102  Rakhyun E Kim "The Emergent Network Structure of the Multilateral Environmental Agreement System" 
(2013) 23 GEC 980 at 981. 
103  Rakhyun E Kim and Brendan Mackey "International Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System" 
(2014) 14 IEA 5. 
104  Thomas Gehring and Benjamin Faude "The Dynamics of Regime Complexes: Microfoundations and 
Systemic Effects" (2013) 19 Global Governance 119 at 120. 
105  See Harro van Asselt and Stefan Böβner "The Shape of Things to Come: Global Climate Governance after 
Paris" (2016) 10(1) CCLR 46; and Kenneth W Abbott "The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate 
Change" (2012) 30 Environment and Planning 571.  
106  José Octavio Valázquez Gomar, Lindsay C Stringer and Jouni Paavola "Regime Complexes and National 
Policy Coherence: Experiences in the Biodiversity Cluster" (2014) 20 Global Governance 119. 
107  Amado S Tolentino "The Ramsar, Biodversity and Climate Change Conventions – Inter-Convention 
Synergies" (2015) 45 EPL 209; and Harro van Asselt "Managing the Fragmentation of International 
Environmental Law: Forests at the Intersection of the Climate and Biodiversity Regimes" (2012) 44 NYUJILP  
1206. 
108  Jessica F Green and Graeme Auld "Unbundling the Regime Complex: The Effects of Private Authority" 
(2017) 6 TEL 259. 
109  Decision XXVIII/1 (2016) Further Amendment of the Montreal Protocol. See also Keith Ripley and Cleo 
Verkuijl "'Ozone Family' Delivers Landmark Deal for the Climate" (2016) 46 EPL 371. 
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VI CONCLUDING REMARKS 
International environmental law has developed undeniably dynamic and innovative responses to 
the fundamental environmental challenges facing the world and the inevitable community interest in 
both the challenges and the responses. These responses have largely taken place within the parameters 
of the traditional rules relating to treaties, institutions and state responsibility although the boundaries 
of international law are undoubtedly stretched from time to time. Today international environmental 
law can be described as "a complex network of norms and institutions"110 that includes "modes of 
regulation that are often transnational, informal and voluntary in character".111 Flexibility is built into 
regimes through treaty architecture, which typically comprises separate instruments dividing the 
general from the technical, and maintained by expedited processes for amendment and an expansive 
approach to decision-making. Participation is maximised – possibly at the cost of effectiveness – 
through introducing variable commitments, which lie along the spectrum between hard and soft law. 
The community interest is recognised through a general prohibition on reservations and the creation 
of innovative compliance mechanisms that do not depend on the interests of individual states. And 
MEAs are continuously innovating. Responding to activities that are subject to significant scientific 
uncertainty the notion of "experimentalist governance" has recently developed, comprising: the 
creational of provisional framework goals and metrics, a decentralised approach to implementation, 
requirements relating to regular reporting, peer review, and periodic reevaluation of goals and 
decision-making practices.112 Experimentalist governance has been used to describe the emerging 
regime for geoengineering as developed under the 1996 London Protocol113 to the 1972 London 
Convention114 but its essential characteristics appear just as applicable to the 2015 Paris Agreement. 
But is this enough and can international environmental law continue to evolve dynamically within 
the constraints of international law, which ultimately is based on 20th century – if not 19th century – 
notions of state sovereignty? Jackson and Bührs argue that there is a difference between regime 
  
110  Rakhyun E Kim "The Emergent Network Structure of the Multilateral Environmental Agreement System" 
(2013) 23 GEC 980 at 988. 
111  Philipp Pattberg and Oscar Widerberg "Theorising Global Environmental Governance: Key Findings and 
Future Questions" (2015) 43 Millenium: Journal of International Studies 684 at 685. 
112  Chiara Armeni "Global Experimentalist Governance: International Law and Climate Change Technologies" 
(2015) 65 ICLQ 875 at 875–888. 
113  Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 
36 ILM 1 (opened for signature 7 November 1996, entered into force 24 March 2006). 
114  Armeni, above n 112, at 875–888. 
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effectiveness and ecological effectiveness and achieving the former does not guarantee the latter115 – 
a conclusion seemingly unchallengeable when considered against the state of the global environment 
in 2018. Kim and Bosselman criticise initiatives that merely seek to address normative 
fragmentation116 and argue instead for legal interpretation that builds "systemic relationships between 
rules by envisaging them as part of the shared purpose",117 underpinned by the principle of ecological 
integrity which operates as a form of "grundnorm".118 Or is international law as a system incapable 
of meaningful environmental protection? Natarajan and Khoday conclude that "our disciplinary 
creeds ties us in overt and subtle ways to particular relationships with the natural environment" that 
"systematically reinforce ecological harm".119 This conclusion, although underpinned by justifiable 
criticism of the relationship between humankind and nature, is excessively bleak and overlooks 
developments in environmental policy and ethics that have occurred in the last 50 years. Its truth, 
however, lies in the acknowledgment that there are limits to dynamic evolution of international 
environmental law under the current system, and future effectiveness of environmental law will likely 
be dependent upon a significant shift in ethical and political thinking around ecological protection in 
the Anthropocene rather than mere development of legal processes and principles in the Holocene. 
 
  
  
115  Wendy Jackson and Ton Bührs "International Environmental Regimes: Understanding Institutional and 
Ecological Effectiveness" (2015) 18 JIWLP 63. 
116  Rakhyun E Kim and Klaus Bosselmann "International Environmental Law in the Anthropocene: Towards a 
Purposive System of Multilaterial Environmental Agreements" (2013) 2 TEL 285 at 296–297. 
117  At 303. 
118  At 386. 
119  Usha Natarajan and Kishan Khoday "Locating Nature: Making and Unmaking International Law" (2014) 27 
LJIL 573 at 592 and 573. They argue that concepts such as sovereignty, development, economic and human 
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